The BMO—Securing Georgia’s Border Against Terrorism . . . and Russia

Jessica Golliday

 

 

The OSCE’s Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) along the Georgian-Russian border officially ended on December 31, 2004 after Russia refused to endorse an extension of the BMO’s mandate.  The BMO is one of the OSCE’s most successful missions and its premature demise is seen by many, including the US and the EU, as unfortunate.  The new OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Slovenian Foreign Minister Dimitrij Rupel, stated on January 13th that “like many others, I regret that the mandate of the Border Monitoring Operation was not extended.  The BMO has been a vital confidence-building measure in a volatile region.”  Russia’s decision not to endorse the BMO’s mandate makes Georgia vulnerable to Russia’s threats of military action and hurts the credibility of the OSCE.  The Georgian Government’s reaction has been aimed at trying to restore an international presence on its borders with Russia.

 

Background

 

The BMO was established in 1999 to monitor the Chechen section of the Georgian-Russian border.  Unarmed border monitors from approximately 30 countries, including Russia, were charged with the task of reporting any movement across the borders.  These reports were then immediately transmitted to all 55 OSCE member countries.

 

In 2001, at the request of the Georgian Government, the BMO’s mandate was extended to include the Ingush section of the Georgian-Russian border.  A year later, in 2002, the OSCE decided to further extend the monitoring operation to the Dagestani section of the border.  In December 2004, at the OSCE’s year-end meeting, the BMO’s mandate again came up for renewal.  By this point it was clear, however, that if the extension of the operation was put to a vote, Russia would veto it.  As a result, the mandate was left to expire in December with no vote being taken.   

 

Russia’s explanation as to why it opposed the extension of the BMO was ambiguous.  Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Alexander Yakovenko said that the BMO had already fulfilled its duties, adding that the mission was not particularly effective.  Conversely, Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, said that the BMO had fulfilled its task by improving the situation along the border and was therefore no longer needed.  Despite Lavrov’s comments, the Russian Embassy in Georgia issued a statement on January 17th, claiming that a “terrorism threat coming from Georgia…is still maintained and represents a serious challenge for the security of Russia as well as for Georgia.”  Additionally, Russia’s Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov stated earlier on January 13th that Russia is ready to pre-emptively strike terrorist bases outside Russian territory,” leading to speculation that Georgia would be the most likely target.  This flurry of conflicting statements has called into question Russia’s real motives for opposing the extension of the BMO if it still views the area as a potential threat.     

 

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia has recently issued a statement in response to Russia’s claims.  It expressed its “extreme concern over the fact that the most volatile section of the Georgian-Russian state border is left without supervision of the international community.”  Due to what the Foreign Ministry characterizes as the Russian Federation’s “extremely drastic and totally ungrounded and unjustified position,” Georgia is calling on the international community to insure the “urgent adoption of every possible measure for the replacement of the border monitoring operation.”

 

Analysis

 

Though Russia’s statements about the BMO are at times contradictory, its underlying intent is clear.  The BMO places a restriction on Russia’s military and political action in the Caucasus region and as a result, Russia wants its demise.  By providing objective evidence that Georgia does not serve as a haven for Chechen fighters, the BMO has helped protect Georgia from Russia’s threats of military action along the border.  This protection is now gone and Russia is free to accuse Georgia of harboring or allowing the passage of terrorists with no credible source to prove the accuracy (or more likely, inaccuracy) of such statements.  The removal of the BMO is a serious threat to Georgia, which is now vulnerable to Russian pre-emptive strikes and Russia’s military intimidation. 

 

In addition to threatening Georgia, Russia is also threatening the credibility of an already weak OSCE by issuing the organization an ultimatum.  Russia refused to sign the 2005 budget until its requested “reforms” to the organization are met.  Russia has outlined several changes in three important divisions of the OSCE—election monitoring, field operations, and budget-formation procedures.  The Russian delegation to the OSCE Permanent Council meeting on January 13th expressed its disapproval of the organization’s election monitoring procedures by stating that the OSCE’s "methodology in election monitoring and its ambition to play the role of a supra-national arbiter were examples of political hypocrisy."  Russia’s discontent over the outcome of Ukraine’s presidential election has led it to blame the OSCE and call for changes in the organization’s election monitoring procedures.  In fact, all of Russia’s requested reforms serve its own interests and the interests of the CIS states that support it rather than the interests of the OSCE as a whole.  An unnamed Russian official is reportedly said that Russia wanted to drastically cut its monetary contribution to the OSCE (from nine percent to a little over one and a half percent) “because this organization does not meet our interests but the interests of other countries.”  In effect, Russia is hurting an organization that is important to encouraging democracy in the region.  Other members of the international community should voice their concern. 

 

The OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Dimitrij Rupel, has tried to remain positive and to work toward resolving the rift in the organization.  This is going to be a difficult task with high stakes: the survival of the OSCE as a credible organization.  Rupel stated on January 26th, “I will not hide from you that there is a sense of crisis in the OSCE.  The recent statements of dissatisfaction from the Russian Federation and some CIS countries must be taken seriously.”

Rupel encouraged his audience “to listen to the voices of all OSCE members, and to build on our strengths.”  The Chairman continues to remain focused on strengthening the OSCE, stating that when he visits Moscow next week, he will point out that “the OSCE is not the problem, it is part of the solution.”

 

What does this all mean for Georgia?  The end of the BMO is a disappointment to many concerned with Caucasian affairs.  The U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE, Stephan M. Minikes, stated that “it is indeed a shame that this neutral monitoring and reporting entity…has not been renewed, despite efforts to make it more efficient, the host country’s request that it continue its operation, and the agreement of 54 [out of 55] participating states to extend its mandate.”  Georgia’s next steps will be to figure out how to secure some kind of international presence on its border with Russia.  Rupel stated on January 26th, that the OSCE “should consider ways to accommodate the Georgian Government’s desire to have international assistance in strengthening its border management capabilities.”  There have been suggestions of EU involvement, perhaps to provide funding, but nothing definite has been agreed upon.  Organizing and implementing a border monitoring operation outside its general sphere of concern will prove to be a major task for the EU that may make EU assistance delayed or not forthcoming.  Another option may be to decrease the scope of the BMO by lessening the number of monitors or length of the border in order to make the mission less costly—but this would also make the operation inefficient.  An additional alternative would be for the states that support the BMO’s mission to send their own border guards to the region in order to establish an objective international presence on the border.  Finally, if an international monitoring operation cannot be reestablished in some form, the international community should provide and expand upon training programs for Georgia’s own border guards so that they could effectively monitor the border.  Whatever the solution, it must be found and enacted quickly as the border will become more vulnerable in the warmer months.

 

As Vladimir Socor has noted in the Eurasia Daily Monitor, there is perhaps one positive side to this unfortunate situation.  The end of the BMO has brought more Western attention and support to Georgia, thus highlighting the country’s vulnerability in the face of Russian threats.  In addition, this situation has demonstrated Georgia’s continuing important geopolitical role in the Caucasus region.  More active involvement by Western countries would help protect Georgia from Russia’s aggressive foreign and military policy.  The unmonitored border with Georgia shows Russia’s limited interest in establishing good cooperative relations with Georgia and, paradoxically, endangers its own security.